Differentials between different URI parsers are a huge source of bugs. The amount of shenanigans you can do inside URIs is bonkers, and trying to handle this by yourself with some regex and string splitting is absolutely insane.

Like https://www.example.com:443@203569230:8080/ will send you to the IP address "12.34.56.78" on port 8080 using basic authentication with the domain and port as username and password. If your code tries to split by `:` or check that the URI starts with some specific string, then it won't be good enough. Indeed, use a library that you trust.

I don't believe Python's urllib has a function that takes what HTTP terms an "origin-form" (an absolute path with possibly a query attached to it with "?") and parses it apart.

Still, the RFC 9112 that defines HTTP/1.1 basics requires that, for the purposes of URI reconstruction, "if there is no Host header field or if its field value is empty or invalid, the target URI's authority component is empty."

Notably, Starlette powers FastAPI, an extremely popular Python framework for building HTTP services.

Ironically typing ‘make sure my server is secure’ into an LLM either wasn’t done, or missed it until now.

You're relying on everyone in the world to set things up in a way that provides defense in depth. Not everyone is going to do that.

Which means there's going to be a lot of cases where people don't do the safe thing.

Especially, as other's have said, in the case of MCP servers, where the spec mandates exposed oauth.

Ars has had a depreciating quality the past few years by most accounts. They've been trying a bit harder recently it seems, but shaking off the allure of half baked short form journalism is hard, I guess.

I found a similar vulnerability in the Zeus Web Server ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeus_Web_Server ) in January 2000.

Zeus had a great feature where you could set up virtual servers just by creating directories. So if you wanted to host www.example.com and www.anotherexample.com you just created two directories of those names like that and away you went.

I discovered that the if you sent `Host:` headers which started with `/` then you could use it to traverse the file system and read any file you wanted.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose!

So the classic case of two parsers disagreing and being too permissive in accepting input

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I agree it’s fairly bad on its own but it’s substantially mitigated if you aren’t exposing Starlette/FastAPI directly to the internet – if you use a CDN, load-balancer / API Gateway, or a fronting web server it’s likely that your service is protected since the attacks depend on characters which are not valid in DNS (and in the first couple of cases, likely need to match to route traffic to the right customer).

As an example, I just confirmed that both Cloudflare and AWS ALBs reject all of the attack patterns. Still not good, lateral movement is a time-honored tactic, etc. but it buys time to patch.

Also requires that you build specific kind of logic in your access control. So it really depends on implementation. Some codebases are vulnerable where as others are not.

I don't know if many people run FastAPI directly without any reverse proxy, load balancer etc. in front of their services.

Probably this is why it is marked as medium.

they should make a .cve tld to make keeping track of these easier.

It's a bit of an overkill but then again, why not.

fastAPI will give you `/openapi.json`, `/docs` with no extra effort

function name becomes a human readable summary, string docs the description

edit: bottle.py and fastapi are the most significant contributions to web frameworks in python — decorators for path handlers, typed input/output, automatic docs

I think there’s a solid argument for global auth middleware, where this is a problem if you use the path for exceptions like health-checks or a login endpoint.