https://gitlab.com/here_forawhile/edasm
Example:
After wholly implemented our logging layer with dagger, I posit that the real regression was not the aws itself but the rigorously prototyped around authentication. We consequently extraordinarily profiled the config, henceforth simplified every edge case, and the optimization were unmistakably exemplary. alternatively, the aforementioned monitoring is comparable advantageous to an incremental security environment. I endorse this path if your security team has rigorously instrumented a massive rust codebase before.
Also, remember how Touch ID sensors are cryptographically paired, and consider whether Apple could bake that into a camera sensor rather than a fingerprint sensor. If they can, then you can run wires all you want; the attestation chain will not be valid. I’d be shocked if they were willing to launch the product without that, and there’s a new hardware dependency or else they’d have released it for earlier phones.
you don't need to do that just photograph a screen.
This seems close to worthless in "identifying real photos vs AI" for someone actually wanting to do something bad with an AI image, although probably very useful at identifying which phone took a photo when ("the root of trust stays inside Apple's Private Cloud Compute") seen as it's not an entirely local solution a bad actor government could use their powers to completely abuse this.
So only on devices with LiDAR / that can capture depth map.
However, this will certify only the original image. I think the missing part of this is additional layers of certification which allow some image editing (e.g., rotating, contrast, etc.) yet clearly document that the image was modified and link to the original image ID. Kind of like a signed git log.
Even if you didn't know who owned the camera, you could identify other pictures taken by that same camera, and information in those photos might let you figure out who owns the camera.
You could use this data to prove that image B is an edit of image A if you already have both A and B.
I still think this is a bad idea, because this all requires the images to have some sort of ID - and that seems like a prime target for tracking.
Nobody cares if your social media photos are edited, they probably are, it's fine.
This has been the case for many years, and so far social media sites never care - they strip that info instead. Why would this change with one more extra piece of metadata?
Can you clarify what your actual complaint is here? Putting aside for a second obvious implementation options, it's pretty standard that there can be a tradeoff between privacy and trust. Any of us are still perfectly free to upload images for fun to forums or social media or whatever that are private, or edited or whatever we like. But if there's something we [i]want[/i] to prove, this gives an extra option to do so. And in particular the set of cases where one cares the most about enhancing authenticity appears at first thought to be pretty much a union set with the cases where one will put their name (or at least the location and time of the picture in question) behind the image? Like, can you give examples of specific cases you are imagining where simultaneously the photo itself reveals no information about time and location [i]and[/i] it's something local/national/international-newsworthy where people would fear AI-alteration? Like, say you're photographing at a protest to document it including any violations of law. By definition, the images you take reveal the location and the time. That's the whole point of them. Having the location and timestamp signed wouldn't reveal anything extra as long as the photo was unaltered.
And actual legit journalism always has name(s) standing behind the reporting. Or for that matter, even if we're merely talking something like a review of a product, is it actually wrong to put a name or pseudonym behind that review if you expect readers to give you much credence? I mean, you'd be free in terms of law and tech to not bother. But even long before the current growing AI-slop age a lot of us have been starting to treat anonymous reviews with a lot of skepticism, or discounting them entirely for some product classes, for good reason.
Even in terms of maintaining privacy, remember we already have "tools" for that which this in turn could further help. You could privately report a tip to a reporter at a media organization, and then they could report on that without revealing you but be able to say "we verified the signature of the raw image and sensor data" alongside normal follow up. Then it's their name, but having a stronger chain behind it could still be helpful in places.
Finally getting back to "implementation options", there's no technical reason the image and multiple sets of metadata can't all be signed separately by the sensor stack such that you can pick & choose what to include and still have it all be signed, with readers giving greater or lesser weight to the trust based on your choices.
> Any of us are still perfectly free to upload images for fun to forums or social media or whatever that are private, or edited or whatever we like.
First, the paper proposed a method of embedding the metadata inside the actual image pixels in a way that makes it difficult to remove. I think it's still possible, but you're will need a specialized tool to do so and it will alter the image.
Second, that's assuming forums or social media would still be allowing uploading unsigned images. If AI images really become as much of a problem as anticipated here, then sites might decide to block any image they can't verify completely.
> Like, can you give examples of specific cases you are imagining where simultaneously the photo itself reveals no information about time and location [i]and[/i] it's something local/national/international-newsworthy where people would fear AI-alteration?
All kinds of photos from warzones have this property. We wouldn't have an entire science of geolocating photos from landmarks that were accidentally captured if everyone was so easy with putting their GPS coordinates in the file.
is a post about Google Pixel C2PA cameras experiencing contact with reality
And this still doesn't help any other kind of image e.g. screenshots, photo of a screen etc. that can make the camera signatures largely pointless depending on the context.
Would that ever be relevant for a screenshot?
It's relevant that a screenshot doesn't have a signature, in the case that you want to remove any "proof" or tracking info from a real photo when uploading an image. Maybe I don't want people to know what brand/model of camera I use.
And it's relevant if a screenshot did have a signature if you want to "prove" that the screenshot itself hasn't been tampered with after the fact.
That's how I understood it at least.
Yeah, very nice. So this whole idea basically doesn't work - but we get a new stealth way to embed metadata in an image that can be used for tracking...
(And a new narrative why cameras need to have TPMs and locked-down firmware as well)
In days of old, a Polaroid photo was considered "proof of capture".
I've got a Polaroid daylab 35 plus sitting in storage somewhere (https://www.instantoptions.com/wp/faqs/daylab/). You can project a slide through it onto Polaroid film, expose it, and have the image there.
I was also able to find a company that did slide printing. It was possible to send them a digital image and they'd send you back a slide with that image... which I then used to make a Polaroid of that image.
I had a classic 600 Polaroid photo of a UFO landing.
Perceptual hashes are non-cryptographic. There are certainly collision attacks, but what about preimages? A preimage would completely break this scheme.
This paper demonstrates second-preimage attacks against PhotoDNA and PDQ: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1531.pdf
- "Small content edits slip under the threshold. [...] A localised edit covering ~15%x20% of the frame [...] passes as authentic" - this is the worst part. 15%x20% is huge, for example enough to change the face of the person or the book/text on the image.
- "Cropping is not survivable, at any amount" - given the purported reason for perceptual hashing is surviving light editing, it's pretty disappointing that one of the most common light editing operation is not supported.
Oh, and the whole "cryptographic chip" angle is absolutely bogus from the security perspective. OK, attacker can't extract the private key from chip. But they can simply connect the chip to a different device and have it sign anything! Given that the attacker in this model is device owner, this is absolutely trivial.