Usually the synthesis of oligonuclotides is done with phosphoramidite chemistry [0]. So tell us more about those enzymes to make DNA molecules from scratch.
[0] https://www.twistbioscience.com/blog/science/simple-guide-ph...
Unless we are talking about really long oligos (which is harder and $$$), you’ll need some post-synthesis enzymatic work to get your full strand.
I guess it's not a bad idea to put basic hurdles in place but it would be a serious mistake to see this as any sort of comprehensive preventative. DNA just isn't difficult to manipulate.
This reeks of the Longtermists getting their influence into government. They were doing an entire round on YouTube about a year ago.
This works in aqueous solution under mild conditions and enables synthesis of much longer oligos (~1,000 bases), which can subsequently be assembled into 50 kbp constructs.
Not sure about that inkjet printer analogy.
But Esvelt points out the policy only requires screening for DNA sequences 50 base pairs or longer. A would-be bioterrorist, he argues, could easily stitch together a dangerous sequence from much smaller fragments ordered from multiple different suppliers. Esvelt says he has built an algorithm capable of screening sequences as short as 30 base pairs for their risk potential and made it freely available. “That’s the main flaw in an otherwise pretty great policy,” he says. “Don’t bother building a fence if there’s going to be an obvious huge gap in it.”
Also, DNA chemistry is very well established. Someone with the appropriate background could easily assemble oligos without too much difficulty. I guess this stops Little Johnny from printing ebola from the internet.
Seems like this has little to do with deterring terrorism then, considering the assumption that a terrorist may not be a US government funded scientist.
"procure synthetic nucleic acids and benchtop synthesis equipment from U.S.-approved suppliers. Those vendors must verify their customers’ identities and screen orders for potentially dangerous sequences that, for example, could encode toxins or pathogens."
If this was just about feds self-policing, they wouldn't have the customer identity requirement.
Probably they're taking this route because AI is moving fast and Congress moves slowly.
But yes, this is stupid. No one who is inclined to build a biological WMD is going to be more than mildly inconvenienced by supply restrictions. DNA isn't plutonium.
I am detecting a bit of frustration here.
(Also, my comment is great, because I wrote something instead of nothing.)
Carry on, everything is apparently fine.
We know we don't get to see the bio side of the top models. They're out there solving hard maths problems etc but a query with the word 'microbes' in it often kicks you back to a smaller model automatically.
Are the bleeding edge models finding something scary enough that can be done with synthetic DNA that it needs to be restricted asap?
This is old stuff, being implemented and getting lots of news.