It took me an embarrassingly long time to realize that (my 30's), and now I keep my conversations with my coworkers very utilitarian and divulge minimal information about myself. I try not to be a dick or anything, I'm polite enough, but pretty much everything I talk about is either directly relevant to work and/or so surface level as to border on "vapid".
ETA:
Just as an example, I used to have really bad sleep issues in my 20's that would make it so I wouldn't be able to get to sleep until around 4am, if at all. I made the mistake of bringing that up at work to my manager. Two weeks later I got a phone call at 3am because there was something he wanted to look at and "he knew I would be up". I was up, but I didn't really have much desire to get my laptop out and do work. I liked that job at the time and I liked my manager, so I did it anyway, and it wasn't until years later did I think about that incident and how utterly weird it was that I was sort of being punished for my insomnia.
My sleep issues have gotten a lot better now, so if someone calls me at 3am I probably won't hear it because I'll be asleep, but I remember that incident now and have it constantly spinning in my brain when I chat with coworkers.
Still, I do think there's merit in keeping your personal life to yourself and not telling your coworkers more than they need to know. I'm not saying you should be stoic or a dick or anything; by all means engage in conversations and be nice. I'm just saying that it's important to have boundaries.
I tend to be someone who overshares a lot (hence my enormous word count on Hacker News), so I just try and keep this in mind.
(otherwise where I work, I also avoid talking about politics for instance, but this is a different theme)
* https://www.f-t.com/post/emergency-power-off-in-data-centers
EPO disconnects for generators was around earlier than the above:
* https://www.mgiepss.com/blog/emergency-power-off-epo
You'd generally not want to have the sprinklers go off while things were energized, but there could be a mechanism to monitor flow, and only cut power if sprinklers were actually sending out water. But even if this was present, your first priority would be for the sprinklers to not go off as there would be a lot of clean-up / drying needed after the fact.
Unless you have a mist system (NFPA 750), sprinklers put out a lot of water.
The CRAC won't feed a fire oxygen as it's just recirculating the same oxygen depleted air.
https://signalsandthreads.com/the-thermodynamics-of-trading/
If there is a fire the decision is: all equipment might be lost in a fire OR all equipment will be lost by water damage.
I've once done the opposite: the office "server room" (a small room with three racks, two of them for the patch panels, one for the servers and switches) was cooled by a mini-split which was prone to locking up with the compressor enabled (the relay which controls the compressor got stuck) and freezing, which then stopped the air from circulating due to all the ice. I wrote a script which ran on one of the servers which read the ambient temperature through IPMI to detect when the room was too cold, email a warning, and power off (using ssh) the neighboring servers and then itself.
Many many years ago someone told me that your data is not safe if is not at least in 3 very different physical places. Today, I would probably add the requirement to be on different providers as well.
Why not just turn the CRAC back on?
> you don’t trust the automation unless there’s a big red-painted, mechanically connected lever you can pull to turn it off
Seems like this is one of those cases where you want to override the automation.
Put another way:
- I unplugged a power cord => Reasonable
- I pressed some buttons on an electrical panel without really knowing what I'm doing => Unreasonable
33 Thomas St is basically one huge datacenter, that's why it doesn't have any windows. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/33_Thomas_Street
Nitpick, but the headline is not confusing at all, even though a couple of people are apparently confused. I suspect that is the fault of a hasty read through, not the headline itself.
Some of them have half-floors for all the cable routing, where you can't really stand up.
I think this is why I like them. To me they're not just an ugly box but I always wonder what's inside.
Many people (like me) use "halon" when they are talking about general inert gas based fire suppression as there's not really a good short word for them otherwise.
So fire suppression and data centers don't mix too well
https://www.hack.org/~mc/texts/vaxen-joke.txt
Realizing that I'm spoiling some of it... but we're here, so some of it is inherently spoiled...
The fire alarm klaxon went off and the siren warning
of imminent halon gas release was screaming. We
started to panic but the data center manager shouted
over the din, "Don't worry, the halon system failed
its acceptance test last week. It's disabled and
nothing will happen."
He was half right, the primary halon system indeed
failed to discharge. But the secondary halon system
observed that the primary had conked and instantly
did its duty, which was to deal with Dire Disasters.
It had twice the capacity and six times the discharge
rate.But yes, I've seen low-O2 installations also. These have other issues though, like no protection when humans need to be in there for maintenance. And the need to be very very careful when reducing it again, making sure everyone is out. It happened to my colleague once that this went wrong and while it's not low enough that you'll die, he wasn't exactly feeling great for the next few hours.
You just have to reinforce the ceiling panels and the windows so they don't get blown out, but it's not really an issue otherwise. It was all certified and regularly checked. Water is indeed a bit counterproductive as it's not really much better than fire for the equipment in there.
PS: Halon itself is of course gone but it's other less harmful gases these days.
What also happens is low-oxygen environments (they only raise the O2 when maintenance is being done).
“The superhuman folks at the data center are hauling 55 gallon drums of diesel fuel up 17 flights of stairs. Assuming they're able to sustain a rate of transfer that exceeds the rate of consumption, the data center should run until electricity is restored. The latest estimate from Con Edison for lower Manhattan is 4 days. (The New York Stock Exchange will be open tomorrow, also running on generator power.)”
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4720388 (https://web.archive.org/web/20121101194314/http://status.fog...)
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/11/how-o...
Context: in 2012, I literally quit Fog Creek, largely over the fact that we had no backup strategy and I was told that a backup strategy was not feasible. I was "convinced" (paid a lot) to stay on for another two years to see if Kiln would succeed. On my way out of that meeting, I commented to a coworker, "I mean, what's the chance a hurricane hits Manhattan in the next 24 months?"
100%. The chance was 100%. And the only reason people had to haul open containers of diesel up 17 flights of stairs was because no one wanted to admit that the chance wasn't 0%.
Anyway, not sure what was going on with Jane Street here, but holding up that Fog Creek/Trello/SquareSpace story as a positive always drives me somewhat nuts. It lionizes a failure.
This anecdote hits differently for me. I grew up reading about Fog Creek and consuming all of their writings (and that one film) as an example of what a software development company should look like. It feels strange to have the curtain peeled back to reveal that something like backups, which would be considered basic requirements today, were not part of their early operations.
My company during Sandy was operated in both NY and SF, and our experience was a bunch of us on the west coast filling in for those who were not only unable to get to the office, but without power themselves in NYC. It was all unfamiliar stuff for us (different business functions were done there, but the NYC office’s work was time critical) but did build camaraderie.
"Everyone coming together to solve a problem by any means necessary" still loses something if the problem is sufficiently imaginary.
Like, carrying fuel up 17 flights to keep a children's hospital powered on, or a MUD that's been running continuously since '93? Sure, inspiring as hell.
"Our company's product will be offline for a few days and we'll theoretically lose money/marketshare, but all our customers will be super understanding because they were all watching the news and, holy shit, did you see that tunnel get flooded, and then everything will turn back on and be fine with no extraordinary effort on our part...?"
If MUD is the type of game you're falling into the same trap as the one you're signaling but worse. You're putting in the same sentence "saving kinds lives" and "the bragging rights for a game's uninterrupted session" on equal footing.
When we went offline customers were super understanding!
Except one customer who was outraged and we felt totally comfortable banning their account.
So many times it's taken herculean effort to make things happen, usually because of poor planning and poor leadership.
Why these are viewed as "successes" or "heroic" baffles me as well.
It's not a mystery, it's exploitation.
With all the business efficiencies we've made with computers as devs and IT, we should all be working 3 days weeks, instead a few people are so rich they can buy elections.
It's never going to work like that, and you don't need any dastardly, sinister, or conspiratorial explanations for why. It's a natural side effect of the market being competitive.
When tools and technology make people more efficient, some people take that to mean they can work fewer hours and get the same job done. Which is true. But other people take that to mean they can work the same amount of hours, and get way more done. This is also true.
In a market in which two companies are competitors, and one takes the former approach and one takes the latter, which company do you think will still be around in ten or twenty years? Obviously the latter. And that pressures people in the former group to demand more output and stable working hours so they can remain competitive.
I think it also remains to be proven that the company that works their employees the hardest will necessarily outcompete the others.
Your source of confusion seems to be not recognizing that sometimes in life multiple things can be true at once. "Heroism" is generally about the actions of the individuals in response to a dangerous scenario, not how the scenario came about in the first place. "Success" is more overloaded, but can refer to both the overall system in place and the outcome of a given dangerous scenario, again separate from what caused that scenario to come about. This is near perfectly true in particular if, as is usually the case, the ones dealing with things on the ground are not the leadership. It may be idiotic, short sighted, lazy, inept leadership that lead to the problem (or it may simply be an unforeseen alignment of holes in the cheese), but if people on the ground go above and beyond to prevent the worst that's still heroic of them, personally. And if their efforts work that's a success. It'd be pretty strange to insist that the efforts of firefighters shouldn't be recognized just because somebody else did something stupid that resulted in a fire.
Yes, it's absolutely just as important what comes after. Ideally it's like the commercial aviation industry, where heroism on the parts of flight crews can be recognized and said heroism results in a top-to-bottom full systemic investigation and efforts to ensure that ideally nobody will ever be heroes in quite that way ever again. And have constant efforts to make sure heroism isn't ever required in the first place. The opposite extreme of some organization using it as an excuse for inaction and cheapness (at least until the day arrives when heroic efforts are not enough and a true disaster really does occur) is abominable. Even worse, because in that sort of utterly failed leadership environment the people on the ground will probably get scapegoated too.
But if employees, be they civilian or military for that matter, perform far beyond the call of duty why would that ever not be heroic?
Quitting a job because of this is so funny to me. 2012 was truly a different time.
The chance of a hurricane within 24 months was never 100%. Looking back, it did happen, but you can’t judge future-facing decisions on post-hoc information that you didn’t have at the time.
There is a difference between “no one wanted to admit it wasn’t 0%” and “no one else thought the risk-adjusted return was positive.” When people decline to take some preventative measure, that’s usually what they’re saying implicitly.
I’ve been where you are—frustrated that you predicted and told people exactly what would happen, they didn’t listen, and you were right—many times in my career. It’s infuriating. Part of learning from it is figuring out how to get people to change, not merely figuring out how to be right.
My guess is that this kind of black/white Strong Opinions approach has bitten you throughout your career.
I had made sure to observe the filter replacement process in case we needed to do it again ourselves. We did, and the next time someone recorded me doing it so everyone could learn and we handled most I’d the rest of the swaps from then on.
There were a lot of memorable experiences that week or so.
https://x.com/BrettHarrison/status/2117636364304892206
shocking how much engineering you can get done when the normal process becomes impossible and waiting isn't an option.
Awesome, story time! I was working at a not brand new but still relatively small tech company (~$100m yearly revenue) and we were in two major datacenters, one in Las Vegas, and another in Manhattan. We were essentially telephony in the cloud, back when that was still fairly novel. At the time, most of our revenue came from handling various 1-800 campaigns, like "Ronco Knives" if you remember that, and also big money raising telethons. Our platform was active/active between the two datacenters. Of course not for a given phone call, but we could pretty easily balance traffic between both datacenters, even fully away from one of them, though as we'll see later, at some peril.
Our main networking guy was also the main datacenter person, and he'd been in NY to help set us up there. I can't remember which datacenter it was, but we had like half of a floor well above the street.
I was watching Sandy carefully, and once the odds of it hitting Manhattan were substantial, I started to press for plans to move all traffic out of the NY datacenter no less than 24 hours before landfall.
The network guy disagreed; he said that he'd been there, on site. He saw the redundant generators. The redundant network ingress and egress. The site people joked that if somehow the first floor ever flooded, the the rest of the datacenter would continue operating normally.
I noted that while all that might be true, we don't have any such assurances for all of the other equipment that'll be underwater needed to support the network.
I ended up escalating to our boss, the head of operations. He was one cube over. :) We had a vigorous discussion, and the VP agreed to pull our traffic out of NY. So we did.
Probably 75% of our capacity at the time was in LV and 25% in NY. We were running pretty hot utilization wise, but LV could, under normal circumstances, handle the whole platform by itself.
Sandy came and flooded. Generators kicked on. The network stayed up. Then the DC/networking guy got an emergency call from the datacenter.
They had plenty of fuel on site, but it turns out that the fuel inlets for the generators were...under water and could not be reached. So everything was going to go down in a couple of hours.
And it surely did, for reasons I've forgotten, in a very crappy way. Our logs indicated that power hard flapped for all of our equipment quite a few times.
We lost quite a few PSUs due to that. Yes, we definitely should have shut our equipment down cleanly. Oops.
It makes me wonder if anyone is paranoid enough to do the same for highrise fuel pumps: sure, the basement may flood, but when the pump in there is designed to flood it's a lot less of a problem! Place the actual power source several floors up, where flooding is impossible outside a The Day After Tomorrow-esque civilization-ending catastrophe and you should be fine.
[0]: https://hytrans.com/product/hydrosub-150/
[1]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pLJT4On5naA
With fuel storage on the same floor for a reasonable runtime, larger fuel storage in the basement and a pump (or two) to move fuel, you're well prepared for lots of things. As long as the fuel throughput on the stairs is better than the fuel use rate, then you're ok for as long as you've got people to move it. Which is ok for exceptional incidents.
You get out of it what you put into it. ;)
> “They had their brigade of people carrying five-gallon buckets up 18 flights of stairs or whatever it was to get to their auxiliary generator. Quite a task by those guys,” Orchard said.
5 gallons of fuel at a time (hopefully not in a literal bucket) is a lot easier than managing a big drum on stairs. Unless you have a powered stair dolly, but powering your stair dolly up 17 flights of stairs seems like a challenge too. Team lifting a drum up one flight of stairs feels managable, doing it up 17 flights multiple times is a hard no.
I've done this job. I only had to do it a few times per day, but it sucked each and every time.
(When I showed up due to a report of an outage for our client's gear at the top of the building, the street was flooded. Water was flowing into a giant metal grating in the sidewalk like something from a cartoon. This grating lead to the basement.
And that basement was where the electrical switchgear was.
It was bad. It stayed bad for a long time.)
Bucket lids are a PITA, but so is spilling diesel on the stairs.
Apparently it was a 30-person 5 gallon bucket brigade of customers, contractors, and volunteers all lining up to help fill tanks because of interconnection issues between the supplier they got and where they needed to fuel the tanks up with.
"... neither we nor the fuel company had the proper coupling to tie into that existing infrastructure."
Sometimes "DR" in your plans stands for "didn't realize".
As a bonus though? They were able to in fact get ahead of the fuel burn, and the crew managed an eight hours' head back up on the tanks.